



# STERN review

ON THE ECONOMICS  
OF CLIMATE CHANGE




DIMITRI ZENGHELIS

# What is the economics of climate change and how does it depend on the science?



Climate change is an externality with a difference:

- **G**lobal
- **U**ncertain
- **L**ong-term
- **P**otentially large and irreversible

# Working with Uncertainty




% Change in Global Cereal Production



# SCIENCE




# Stabilisation and Commitment to Warming



# DAMAGES




# Projected Impacts of Climate Change



# Understanding Disaggregated Impacts


- **Developing countries** (especially vulnerable)
  - Rising water stress
  - Falling agricultural yields/incomes
  - Malnutrition and disease
  - Migration and conflict
- **Developed countries** (not immune)
  - Water stress in S. Europe and California
  - Costs of extreme weather events
  - Sea level rise
  - Higher insurance costs





***Models only have partial coverage of impacts***  
***Values in the literature are a sub-total of impacts***

# 'Balanced Growth Equivalents'



# Aggregate Impacts Matrix

- Essential to take account of **risk and uncertainty**
- Models do **not** provide **precise** forecasts
- Assumptions on **discounting, risk aversion and equity** affect the results

	Market impacts	Broad impacts
Baseline climate	5% Range 0-12%	11% Range 2-27%
High climate	7% Range 1-17%	14% Range 3- 32%

# Discounting


Pure time discount rate (%) $\delta$	Probability of human race surviving 100 years
0.1	0.905
0.5	0.607
1.0	0.368
1.5	0.223

Discount Rate:  $\eta \times \text{GDP growth rate} + \delta$

# STABILISATION



# Economics of Stabilisation



Stabilising below 450ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e would require emissions to peak by 2010 with 6-10% p.a. decline thereafter.


If emissions peak in 2020, we can stabilise below 550ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e if we achieve annual declines of 1 – 2.5% afterwards

# MITIGATION COSTS



# Strategies for Emission Reduction

## ENERGY EMISSIONS



Total emissions in 2000: 42 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e.

## Four ways to cut emissions:

- reducing demand
- improving efficiency
- lower-carbon technologies
- non-energy emissions



# Estimating Costs of Mitigation

Expected cost of cutting emissions consistent with 550ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e stabilisation trajectory averages 1% of GDP per year.

- Macroeconomic models: 1% of GDP in 2050, in range +/- 3%.
- Resource cost: 1% of GDP in 2050, in range -1% to +3.5%.


Costs will not be evenly distributed:

- Competitiveness impacts can be reduced by acting together.
- New markets will be created. Investment in low-carbon electricity sources could be worth over \$500bn a year by 2050.


Strong mitigation is fully consistent with the aspirations for growth and development in poor and rich countries.

# Illustrative Marginal Abatement Option Cost Curve


Marginal  
cost per unit  
GHG  
abated \$



# The Relationship Between the Social Cost of Carbon and Emissions Reductions




# Illustrative Cost Per Unit of GHG Abated for a Specific Technology




# Illustrative Distribution of Emission Savings by Technology

**Contributions to Carbon Abatement 2025**




Abatement 11 GtCO2

**Contributions to Carbon Abatement, 2050**



Abatement 43 GtCO2


# Average Cost of Reducing Fossil Fuel Emissions to 18 GtCO<sub>2</sub> in 2050



**Table 9.1 Annual total costs of reducing fossil fuel emissions to 18 GtCO<sub>2</sub> in 2050**

	2015	2025	2050
Average cost of abatement, \$/t CO <sub>2</sub>	61	33	22
Emissions Abated GtCO <sub>2</sub> (relative to emissions in BAU)	2.2	10.7	42.6
Total cost of abatement, \$ billion per year:	134	349	930

# Schematic Representation of How to Select a Stabilisation Level



# POLICY






# Key principles of international action

Effective action requires:


- Transparency and mutual understanding of actions and policies
- Long-term quantity goals to limit risk
- Short-term flexibility to limit costs
- A broadly comparable global price for carbon
- Cooperation to bring forward technology
- Moving beyond sticks and carrots
- Equitable distribution of effort
- Informing and mobilising public opinion

# Global carbon markets can be expanded



- Increasing the size of global carbon markets – by expanding schemes to new sectors or countries, or linking regional schemes – can drive large flows across countries and promote action in developing countries

# Technology needs more than a carbon price



Carbon price alone not enough to bring forward the technologies we need

One way of doing this is through global public funding for technologies:

- R&D funding should double, to around \$20 bn
- Deployment incentives should increase 2 to 5 times, from current level of \$34 bn

# Adaptation

**Adaptation** is inevitable: climate change is with us and more is on the way


## **Adaptation cannot be a substitute for mitigation**

- only reduce the costs of climate change...
- ...but these are rising rapidly
- for severe impacts there are limits to what adaptation can achieve
- Doesn't address risks and uncertainty

## **Adaptation crucial in developing countries**

# Adaptation

- Development increases resilience
- Adaptation will put strong pressure on developing country budgets and ODA: essential to meet 2010 and 2015 commitments
- International action also has a key role in supporting global public goods for adaptation
  - Disaster response
  - Crop varieties and technology
  - Forecasting climate and weather



## Conclusion from Stern analysis

Unless emissions are curbed, climate change will bring high costs for human development, economies and the environment

- Concentrations of 550ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e and above - very high risks of serious economic impacts
- Concentrations of 450ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e and below - extremely difficult to achieve *now* and with current and foreseeable technology

Limiting concentrations within this range is possible. The costs are modest relative to the costs of inaction.

Decisive and strong international action is urgent: delay means greater risks and higher costs



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